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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE ·STATE OF UTAH 
CLYDE HUTCHESON, 
vs. 
Plaintif~ and 
Appellant, 
_LARRY GLEAVE, PATRICIA 
GLEAVE, DELOY SHAW, and 
HELEN SHAW, 
: 
: 
: 
Defendants and : 
Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
No. 16944 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
The parties entered· into an Earnest Money Receipt 
and' Offer to Purchase Agreement. Plaintiff thereafter defaulted 
in making payment; the contract was terminated; and Defendants 
retained the earnest money. Plaintiff's complaint as amended 
sought to rescind the agreement claimirig (1) that conditions 
precedent had not been completed, and (2) that Defendants had 
misrepresented material facts. Plaintiff made no claim of 
unjust enrichment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The Lower Court found that the Plaintiff had failed 
'• 
to establish a basis for either. of the causes of action 
pursued by him, and further proceeded to consider -~be appro-
priateness of the agreed upon liquidated damages. being retained 
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by Defendants, finding specifically that such were reasonable 
and commensurate with actual damages sustained by Defenda~ts. 
RELIEF SOUGHT O~. APPEAL 
Defendants seek an affirmance of the Lower Court's 
decision .. 
STATEMENT OF FACTSl 
In the fall of 1977 ,_·the parties negotiated concern-
ing Plaintiff's purchasing from Defendants a large ranch in 
Piute County known as the Elbow Ranch. The Plaintiff had 
~· . 
originally had contact with a real estate agent, Cathy Bagley,. 
but visited the.property with one of the Defendants, who 
pointed out boundaries, identifLed properties which did not 
go with the sale, and expl~ined the sprinkling irrigation 
system. 
An Earne.st Money Agreement dated November l~, 1977 
was drafted, but not concurred in; a second one was drafted 
and executed by the p~rties on December 6, 1977. The agreement 
called for certain payments and for a closing date of March 
15, 1978. Plaintiff defaulted in the payments due, and an 
1This statement of facts is designed to give a brief overview 
and does not refer to the transcript nor inconsistencies with 
the statement which appears in Plaintiff's brief. This 
approach has been taken because of the author's opihion that 
the Plaintiff's brief is essentially an attack on the factual 
findings of the district court, and on the assumption that 
references to the trial trans~ript and to the allegations of 
Plaintiff's brief which are inconsistent herewith can best be 
handled in the argument portion of the brief. The ~uthor 
recognizes some duplication between the instant factual 
synopsis and the more exhaustive treatment under his argument 
and seeks the Court's indulgence as to the same. 
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amendment to the contract was adopted February 28, 1978. The 
latter agreement modified the payment schedule and extended 
the closing date to April 10, 1978. Plaintiff was given 
permission to commence his farming operation on March· 
15 (before closing), and in turh the real estate agent was 
authorized to release payments to the Defendants·as they· 
were made by Plaintiff. 
Defendants were heavily indebted to Zions Bank on 
the subject ranch, which fact was discussed amon~ t~e parties, 
and the payment schedules were designed to coordinate with 
the payments due Zions, including a substantial payment due 
in April, 1978. 
Pursuant to the terms of the agreement thus reached, 
Pla~ntiff paid the sum of $40,000.00.· Defendants applied 
the same against their obligations; remedying a default 
which then existed with Zions, and prepared to close the 
transaction on April 10. 
On April 10, 1978 the parties met in the office of 
Defendants' attorney K. L. Mciff in Richfield, Utah. All of 
the closing documents had· been prepared and were ready for 
execution; all of the parties, their attorneys, the real 
estate agent, and the title company representative .were 
present. The Defendants were fully pr~pared to close and to 
perform everything incumbent upon them. The agreement 
. . 
provided that the Plaintiff was to receive some 3,JBO acres. 
Defendants were prepared to deliver 3,743.5. The agreement 
provided that the Plaintiff was to receive "all mineral, 
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oil, and gas rights presently with the ranch". The Defendants 
were prepared to deliver accordingly, and had not undertaken 
to alienate any of those rights. The Defendant~ were to 
insure that there were three center pivot sprinkling systems 
in complete working order. Repres~ntatives from the manufac-
turer of the sprinkling systems had spent the week· preceding 
at the ranch, and Defendants were prepared to fully comply 
with this requirement. The approval of Zions Bank to the 
transaction was to have been secured, and in factrhad been 
secured. 
During what was to have been the closing session, 
a clarification was requested in one of the closing documents, 
and a secretary was standing by prepared to make the same. 
She even agreed to stay late. Plaintiff's counsel thereupon 
announced that such urgency did not exist with respect to 
making any necessary corrections for the reason that Plaintiff 
did not have his money. 
Defendants acquiesced in Plaintiff having some 
additional time; Plaintiff and his attorney representing that 
they could have the money by the end of the following week, 
that being approximately ten days. As soon as the money was 
in hand, they were to notify Defendants or Defendants' 
attorney so that the latter could adjust the closing instru-
ments as needed. 
' ·~ 
At all relevant times both before and after April 
10, (the agreed upon closing date), Plaintiff assured Defendant~ 
that he would take care of the farming operation: -that hP Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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would plant the necessary crops; watch the sprinkling systems; 
and indicated that he was moving on the premises for that 
purpose. At Plaintiff's request, Defendants help~d him 
locate seed, machinery, financing for the latter, and farming 
help. In reliance on Plaintiff, Defendants ,laid off their 
two h~red employees and undertook no planting _or seeding of 
their own. 
Plaintiff failed to do any planting;_ failed to 
watch the sprinklers; and did little other than some minor 
i :; 
ditch work and removed two loads of hay from the property. 
As a result, the crops were not planted; the sprinklers were 
not watched,_ resulting in some minor damage; and when the 
transaction was terminated, Defendants had lost the utiliza-
tion of the irrigated ground for the 1978 season, resulting 
in an unchallenged loss to them of $56,100.00. 
Plaintiff did not come up with his money some ten 
days following the scheduled closing as promised, and never 
at any time thereafter advised Defendants that he had his 
money and was prepared to close. The money was the subject 
of numerous conversations during the months of April and May, 
but Plaintiff never came up with the same. By June 1, 
Plaintiff's delinquency amounted to $110,000 and consisted of 
his failure to pay the $60,000 due Apr~l-10, $25,000 due May 
1, and an additional $25,000 due June 1. 
Finally, on June 5, 1978 the Defendant G~eave and 
his attorney called the Plaintiff's attorney in.Arizona and 
recommended that they agree on a "cut-off" date. Plaintiff's 
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attorney was allowed to set the date, and set the same for 
June 15, 1978. Failing performance by Plaintiff on that 
date, it was Defendants' expressed intent to "go another 
route". The telephone call was followed up on the same date 
with a registered letter to Plaintiff's attorney reflecting 
the agreement, indicating the loss Plaintiff would suffer, 
and advising that if Plaintiff did. not perform, Defendants 
"would make whatever other arrangements they deemed advan-
tageous to them". 
The cut-off date passed and nothing was heard from 
Plaintiff. The next contact from Plaintiff ·came during the 
early part of July. Defendants were then over ninety days 
delinquent on their pay~ent due Zions Bank, and a_notice of 
default had been filed by the said Bank. Defendants advised 
Plaintiff that their deal was off, but that they would re~ 
negotiate a new deal with him if he would come up with his 
money. Defendants further advised that they were considering 
selling their water to other potential purchasers. Plaintiff 
never did come up with any money, and finally on August 17, 
1980 Defendants sold all their major water rights, applying 
the down payment received to cure ·the default at Zions Bank. 
Plaintiff thereafter brou~ht the instant suit seeking specific 
performanc~; then later amended seeking recission, alleging 
(1) unperformed conditions precedent and (2) fraud. 
' 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE' FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT 
ARE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
Plaintiff's argument on appeal is essentially an 
attack on the findings of the trial court. The cas·e law 
cited by Plaintiff has limited ~pplication, since ii is 
necessarily dependent upon factual allegations or factual 
determinations inconsistent or contradictory to those found 
,, 
by the trial court. 
For the foregoing reason, an unusual amount of time 
and space has been devoted to consideration of the facts as 
established by the evidence and as found by the trial court. 
The applicable rule of judicial review in this kind· 
of case was set forth by Justice Crockett in the frequently 
cited case of Charlton vs. Hackett, 11 U2d 389, 360 P2d 176 
(1961), in which the court stated: 
In considering the attack on the findings 
and judgment of the trial court it is our duty 
to follow these cardinal rules of review: to 
indulge them a presumption of validity and 
correctness; to require the appellant to 
sustain the burden of showing error; to review 
the record in the light most favorable to 
them; and not to disturb them if they find 
substantial support in.the evidence. 
The findings of the trial court, as announced from 
the bench, appear in the tri~l transcript beginning on-page 
304. Written findings of fact were also made by ~he court 
and appear in the record on appeal beginning at R-55. 
In abbreviated form, the court found that the 
parties had entered into a binding Earnest Money Agreement; Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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that when they met for closing on April 10, there was a 
meeting of the minds on all relevant matters; that there were 
only minor housekeeping items to be tended to; bu~ that the 
transaction failed to close because of Plaintiff's failure to 
make the payment due. The court further found that Plaintiff 
was given an opportunity to make the payment thereafter; that 
numerous contacts took place between the parties; that it was 
up to the Plaintiff to get his money and notify .the Defendants; 
that this he failed to do; and that at no time did he come 
,, 
forward with his money. In addition, the court found that 
the matter was terminated by an agreement between Plaintiff's 
attorney, Defendants' attorney, and the Defendant Gleave in 
which a cut-off date was set; t~at Plaintiff failed to comply 
with such agreement within the time frame agreed upon or any 
time thereafter; that under the contract, Defendants had the 
option of retaining the $40,000.00 paid by Plaintiff as 
liquidated and agreed damages; that Defendants elected to 
retain the same; and that the darnage3 suffered by Defendants 
were at least commensurate with said amount, such damages 
arising because of Plaintiff's failure to perform necessary 
farming operations, and such damages further not being unreason-
able in light of the size of the transaction involv~d and the 
fact that Defendants' property was tied. up from December 6, 
1977 through June 15, 1978. 
In an effort to show the support for the ~ourt's 
findings which exists in the record, and in an effort to 
' dispell misimpressions which this writer thinks are created 
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~ in Plaintiff's recitation of the facts and the conclusions 
drawn .therefrom, a careful review of relevant evidence is set 
forth hereafter. 
During the fall of 1977 1 Plaintiff, in the company 
of a real estate agent with whom Defendants had listed their 
ranch for sale, came to the Elbow Ranch and physically examined 
the same with the Defendant Shaw (Tr. 210). Shaw pointed out 
the boundaries and specifically the properties 6£ Verl Henrie 
and Keith Barben, which were not a part of the ranch (Tr. 
210, 211). In cross-examination, the Plaintiff acknowledged 
that Shaw had pointed out the Verl Henrie property as being 
excluded from the ranch, and further that while conducting 
this personal examination Plaintiff had observed the Barben 
property, including ·the house thereon, but didn't know if it 
went with the ranch or not and didn't ask (Tr. 152, 153). He 
"presumed", however, that it didn't go (Tr. 157). The history 
of the Elbow Ranch and what properties may or may not have 
been included therein at some prior point in time was not 
discussed with Plaintiff (Tr. 83). 
Also on the occasion of Plaintiff's visit to the 
property in the fall of 1977, the Defendant Shaw showed him 
the three major circular sprinkling systems and· described 
their capacity ( rrr. 213). The .capacity of the said systems I 
together with supplemental systems available, exceeded the 
' capacity set forth in the real estate agency's brochure. 
(Compare Exhibit 7 and Exhibit 22.) The sprinklers were 
installed and were in complete working order o~ April 10, Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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(the date set for closing), as called for by the contract 
{Tr. 208, 275). 1 
A preliminary Earnest Money Receipt and.Offer to 
Purchase {Exhibit 10) dated November_l2, 1977 was passed back 
and forth between the parties, but counteroffers appearing 
therein prevented its being agreed upon. An agreement was, · 
however, reached in an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to 
Purchase (Exhibit 11) dated December 6, 1977. The agreement 
called for a purchase price of $962,500.00--$2,0po.po upon 
execution, $8,000.00 on December 20, $10,000.00 on January 5, 
$30,000.00 on February 1, etc. Plaintiff's check or checks 
for the· first two payments were dishonored (Tr. 87 and 159), 
and the. agreement fell into default (Tr. 264). The contradt 
was redone on February 28 for that reason, as is evidenced by 
the Plaintiff's response (Tr. 160, commepcing line 17 and 
continuing. through line 20): 
Q (Mr. Mciff) So, returning to that 
question, the reason that you redid the contract 
on February 28th is because you were in 
default, you had not made the payments? 
A (Hutcheson} Yes, that's perfectly 
corre.ct. 
1The trial transcript entries relied on by Plaintiff in his 
assertion to the contrary relate to prpblems which developed 
later in the season (August was the only date pinpointed) and 
was fairly attributable to the Plaintiff's failure to move 
onto the ranch and watch th~ sprinkling systems as he had 
agreed to do (Tr. 236-328). Atter April 10, the parties had 
some occasional difficulty with the sprinklers but'made 
repairs and adjustments on an ongoing basis as the same 
became necessary (Tr. 276). The problems which.arose during 
1978 were not attributable to the manufacturer as implied in 
Plaintiff's statement of facts, which point was specifically 
made by the Defendant Shaw (Tr. 216). -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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A third Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase 
was prepared bearing date of February 28, 1978 (Exhibit 12), 
and was executed on March 6, 1978 (Tr. 267). The agreement 
was styled an "Amendment to Original Agreement Dated December 
6, 1977" and adopted a new payment schedule as well as refer-
ring back to the December 6 agreement for certain provisions. 
Under the agreement thus reached, ~laintiff was to 
receive "approximately 3,700 acres" (see Exhibit 11, line 5). 
Defendants were actually prepared to deliver some 3,.743.5 
acres (Tr. 85 and 157). 
The December 6 agreement, as incorporated in the 
February 28 agreement, provided that Plaintiff was to receive 
"all mineral, oil, and gas rights presently with the ranch" 
(see Exhibit 11, lines 48 and 49). The Defend.q.nts Gleave and 
Shaw never undertook to withhold any mineral rights and were 
at all times prepared to convey whatever they had (Tr. 90, 
112 and 253). The Court found that the agree~ent was.clear 
in that regard (Tr. 305), and that the Defendants were at all 
times prepared to comply (Findings of Fact, Finding No. 8)·. 
·The transaction was to have originally closed on 
March 15 (Exhibit 11, line 17). The final Earnest Money 
Agreement provided for a closing date of April 10, l978 
(Exhibit 12, lines 15 and 16), but prov~ded that "Seller 
gives permission to the Buyer.to be on the premises and do 
whatever is necessary to farm the property--as of ~arch 15, 
1978" (Exhibit 12, lines 52 and 53). In cross-examination, 
Defendant acknowledged this responsibility (Tr. 160, line 21 
through Tr. 161, line 3): 
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Q (Mr. Mciff) Now, when you entered 
into the agreement of February 28th, you set a 
closing date of April 10th; isn't that correct? 
A (Hutcheson) Yes. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) At which time you were 
to make a payment of $60,000.00? 
A (Hutcheson) Correct. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) True? 
A (Hutcheson) True. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) And notwithstanding 
that closing date of April 10th, you were to·· 
enter into possession on March 15th and commence 
the farming operation; true? 
A (Hutcheson) True. 
In consideration of being entitled to commence the 
farming operation, the Plaintiff agreed that the payments 
made by him prior to the closing date could be released 
directly to the Defendants (Tr. 218). The Defendant Shaw. 
testified that tho Plaintiff was going to plant crops of 
varying acres under the three sprinklers (Tr. 219); that he 
went with Plaintiff to Intermountain Farmers and arranged· for 
oats and alfalfa seed (Tr. 220); that he a~d Gleave went with 
Plaintiff to arrange financing on a tractor at Valley Central 
Bank (Tr. 219); that at Plaintiff's request he lined up a 
farmer to disk and prepare the ground for planting (Tr. 220); 
that he was later advised by Plaintiff that Plaintiff had 
arranged with someone from Beaver to do the preparation work; 
and that never at any time did the Plaintiff ever's~y that he 
was not going to handle.the farming operation (Tr. 234). In 
response to the gues.tion "did he assure you that .. he was going Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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to undertake the farming operation" the Defendant Shaw testi-
fied "Yes, he told me all the time that he was going to start 
farming it. He would come up from Arizona and I would assume 
that he was·going to start, and then he would be gone, and 
then he would call me on the phone and tell me that he had a 
few things down there and that he would be up in a few days 
to get ready to start doing it." (Tr. 220, line 29 through 
Tr. 221, Line 3). 
When asked a similar question, the Plaintiff'~ 
,, 
response was uncertain but falls short of a denial (Tr. 162, 
lines 7 through 12): 
Q (Mr. Mciff) And you represented to 
them that you were ~oing to do that; that you 
were actually going to do what needed to be 
done to get the farm operation started; did 
you not? 
A (Hutcheson) I don't know if I told 
him I would do it. I just wanted the right if 
I wanted to. 
The Plaintiff did, however, acknowledge that he 
intended to plant under the third sprinkler and some unde~ 
the first sprinkler (Tr. 162 and 163); that the Defendant 
Gleave helped him locate seed, checking first in Richfield, 
then Denver, and ultimately locating the same in Delta (Tr. 
163 and 164); and that Shaw, in fact, assisted him in locat-
ing equipment to do the preparation work (Tr. 164). The 
evidence further showed that Plairttiff did do some ditch work 
(Tr. 205), and removed two loads of hay from the pr~perty 
(Tr. 234). 
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In reliance on Plaintiff, Defendants laid off two 
hired men whom they.had previously employed (Tr. 217); the 
necessary soil preparation and planting was not accomplished; 
no crops were raised under two of the sprinkling systems and 
only a partial crop under the third {Tr. 221 and 222). The 
uncontradicted and unchallenged evidence before the Trial ,· 
Court was that the net loss to the Defendants, after deducting 
the costs and expenses· of a normal operation~ was $56,100.00 
(Tr. 233 and 258) 1 
Plaintiff's allegation in his statement of facts 
that the Defendants continued in possession of the property 
and operated it "as usual" during the entire year of 1978 is 
not supported by the evidence. Plaintiff.cites Tr. 238 and 
239 wherein the Defendant Shaw explained that the livestock 
remained on the ranch about the same as in other years, but 
earlier in his testimony he had explained that the Plaintiff 
was originally going to buy Defendants' livestock, and when 
an agreement was not reached thereon, the Plaintiff decided 
he wouldn't run livestock and agreed that the Defendants 
1Plaintiff asserts that since he was entitled to possession, 
under Defendant's theory, he was also entitled to all of the 
crops produced. That agrument may have merit if the Plain-
tif.f had paid Defendants the fair rental .value of the ranch 
for the 1978 season, either in cash or~y sharecropping. 
Under Plaintiff's theory, Defendants would lose the entire 
1978 crop, the utilization of the crop ,ground, receive no 
rental value, and then be required to return the $40,000.00 
received from Plaintiff, a sum significantly less -than the 
uncontroverted evidence as to the damages sustained by 
Defendants. 
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could run their stock on the ranch during the 1978 season. 
(Tr. ·223, 224). 1 
The parties met as scheduled on April 10, 1978 in 
the office of the Defendants' attorney, Mr. Mciff, for the 
purpose of closing the transaction. The parties were all 
present, represented by counsel, an<l the real estate. agent 
and the title company representative were in attendance 
(Tr. 71} • 
All of the documents required for clo~in~ had been· 
prepared and were presented at the closing session (Tr. 72 
and 84). A succinct narration of what occurred in the 
closing session appears in the testimony of the Defendant 
.Gleave. Beginning with line 15 on page 272 of the trial 
transcript, the following appears: 
A (Gleave} On April 10th when we met 
the payment, everything was laid on the table, 
we were prepared to close. Then I didn't see 
a check floating around. I asked Clyde Hutcheson 
if he had his money. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) And what was his response? 
A (Gleave) He said, "No, we don't." 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Did you have any further 
discussion regarding your obligation to Zions? 
A (Gleave) Yes. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Would you tell us what 
was said on that occasion? 
1The Defendants' proof of damages did not claim any loss by 
not being allowed the use of the grazing rights. They limited 
their claim and proof thereof to loss of crops, which would 
normally have been cut and harvested from the irrigated 
ground .. 
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A (Gleave) We told him it was very . 
difficult for us to wait any longer on him; 
that we needed to do something fast in order 
to mak2 our paym~~t to Zions Bank. 
Q ·(Mr. Mciff) Did Mr. Hutcheson ever · 
indicate that he wouldn't have to make those 
payments until October 15th? 
A ·{Gleave) No. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) When is the first fime 
you ever heard that suggestion? 
A (Gleave) Yesterday in Court. 1 
Q (Mr. Mclff) Was there any 4isGussion 
at that meeting as to when that payment, that 
$60,000.00 payment could be made? 
A (Gleave) Both he and John Robinson 
at that meeting, who was his attorney, assured 
us that payment would be made by the end of 
the week. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) The following week? 
A (Gleave) The following week. 
Q (Mr." Mciff) At that meeting were 
you and Mr. Shaw ready, willing and able to 
conclude the transaction? 
A (Gleave) Yes, that was the reason 
we were there. 
THE COURT: At what meeting? 
MR. McIFF: April 10th. 
A (Gleave) On April 10th we were 
ready, willing, and able. 
1Plaintiff gave contradictory testimony. At various point~ 
of the trial, he said that he did not have to make'any addi-
tional payments, including the closing payment, ~ntil October 
15,· though in cross-examination he twice admitted that he was 
obliged to make the payments as scheduled. The full text of 
his testimony to that effect, appears on pages l~ and 24 of 
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Q (Mr. Mciff) On April 10th were the 
sprinkling systems up and in operation? 
A (Gleave) Yes. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Had Valmont [the manu-
facturer] been there the preceding week? 
A (Gleave) Yes. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) When we met on April 
10th for the purpose of closing, were all of 
these proposed closing documents acceptable to 
you? 
A (Gleave) Yes, they were. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) At that meeting was 
there any discussion about Zions Bank approving 
the sale to Mr. Hutcheson? 
A (Gleave) Yes, there was. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) What was said in that 
connection? 
A (Gleave) Mr. Bushnell asked me if 
permission had been granted by Zions Bank and 
I told him it had. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) And was that a matter 
of fact? 
A (Gleave) Yes, a matter of fact .. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Was there a discussion 
about the Verl Henrie property and the Keith 
Barben property? 
A (Gleave). They were pointed out in 
the closing, yes. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) And was there any 
objection raised in relation to those items?-
A (Gleave) No, there was not. 
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Q (Mr~ Mciff·) Was there a discussion 
about the mineral rights? 
A (Gleave) Yes. 
Q (Mr. Mciff). When you advised the 
parties that that document stood [pre-existing 
lease on certain of the mineral rights], was 
there any objection? 
A (Gleave) No, there was no objections. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) You've heard some 
discussion and some testimony about redrafting 
the Uniform Real Estate Contract or ma~ing a ·. 
modification in it? 
A (Gleave) Yes. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) What did that relate 
to? 
A (Gleave) It related to a Quitclaim 
Deed, in the documents, and there's no reference 
to it in the Uniform Real Est~te Contract. We 
wanted a reference made to tlv1t Quitclaim Deed 
entered into the contract and while we were 
sitting at the desk someone raised the question, 
"How long will that take, 0 and you called your 
secretary into the room and she stated she 
would stand by while we discussed it in order 
to type up that document th.at day. 
Q (Mr. Mclff} Were there any other 
things you recall about the contract that were 
modified or changed in any respect? 
A· (Gleave} No. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) And the .suggested 
reference to the Quitclaim Deed was that by 
way of modif icatiqn· or ciarif ication? 
A (Gleave) Clarification. 1 
"'· 
The real estate agent, Cathy Bagley, agreed that any change 
was properly characterized as a "clarification" and not a 
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Q (Mr. Mclff) Mr. Gleave, were there 
to your. knowledge any items to be subsequently 
ne.gotiated upon, any items that there had not 
been an agreement, concerning which there had 
not been an a·greement reached? 
A (Gleave) No. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Would you tell the 
Court the discussion--the relationship that 
was had in relation to the redrafting of the 
basic contract? 
A (Gleave) The redrafting of the 
basic contr~ct was only to pick up this o~e 
incident you have already noted. We w~re 
prepared to redraft it there that day. We 
were having to keep Mr. Mciff's secretary late 
in order to do it and she agreed to stay late. 
When the money,· when we. realized, and this 
discussion wa~ after the money--when we realized 
that. 
THE COURT: Who said what to whom? 
A (Gleave) Mr. Mciff agreed there 
that we would redraft the documents, called 
his secretary into the office, and asked her 
if she would stay and type the documents as we 
needed them. She agreed to do so. Then John 
Robinson said at that time that we didn't need 
to hurry· that fast, that they weren't prepared 
to make a payment anyway, so we could redraft 
the documents as soon as they got their money. 
a· (Mr. Mciff) Was there any discussion 
as to what was to trigger that or how we were 
to know? 
A (Gleave) Now, John Robinson was 
going to call and tell us when they had the 
money ready for us.· 
Q (Mr. Mciff) And when he called us~ 
and advised us that they had the money :r::eady, 
what was to happen then? 
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A (Gleave) We were to prepare the 
documents and.have them ready so they could 
give the money to us and transfer the documents .. 
Q (Mr. Mclff) Were you prepare~ to do 
that at any time_? 
A (Gleave) Yes. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Were you ready, willing, 
and able at all times to close this transaction? 
A (Gleave) After--
Q (Mr. Mciff) After April 10th? 
A (Gleave) 1 After April 10th, yes, ... 
Q (Mr. Mciff) You previously testified 
that, as I recall, John Robinson said he would 
call us that next week and hopefully call at 
the end of the next week. To your knowledge, 
did we ever get such a call? 
A 
call. 
(Gleave) No, we didn't get such a 
Q (Mr. Mciff) To your knowledge did 
we ever receive a call advising them that 
we're to close? 
A (Gleave) No. 
In an effort to justify his failure to make the 
payments, Plaintiff's brief places improper reliance on a 
hand-written note of the real estate agent, Cathy Bagley, 
which appears at the bottom of the February 28 agreement. 
That hand~written note is as follows: 
1The Defendant Shaw testified to the same effect (Tr. 253). 
Also, the real estate agent,· Cathy Bagley, called by Plain-
tiff as a witness, testified that Defendants were prepared to 
close the transaction up until the point that it v.ra'S anno:.d1ced 
that Plaintiff did not have his money (Tr. 86). She further 
testified that any redrafting or further preparation of 
closing documents was awaiting notification from Plaintiff's 
attorney (Tr •. 92), and that Defendants were at all times 
prepared to do such paperwork (Tr. 101). ~ Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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The balance of 1978 payments is to be secured 
by a mortgage on a 42-unit motel known as the 
"Time Motel" of Flagstaff, Arizona, or property 
of similar value. Interest at the rate of 
8-1/2% per annum on the unpaid portion.of the 
down payment will be due and payable when the 
balance of the 1978 payment is made (No.later 
than October 15, 1978). 
The record is void of any evidence to support Plaintiff ls 
conclusion that the payments Plaintiff was obliged to ·make· 
were conditioned upon a sale in Arizona. 1 The handwritten 
statement, when carefully read, simply provides that Plain-
:" ,., 2 
tiff was to secure the 1978 payments with a mortgage on 
Arizona property, and further.that the interest on such 
payments was due no later than the final 1978 payment which 
was due October 15. 
Real estate agent Cathy. Bagley, who made this hand-
written entry, gave the following testimony with respect to 
the same (Tr. 89, line 18 through Tr. 90, line 2): 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Okeh, and specifically, 
·what I'm asking you is this: Was that, based 
on your conversations with the parties, designed 
to eliminate the necessity of Plaintiff making 
the payment at the time of the closing? 
A (Bagley) No. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) He was to make the 
closing payment? 
1Plaintiff's effort to tie the sale of 150 acres of farm 
ground in Arizona to the agreement to give a mortgage on a 
motel in Arizona has no ra~ional basis or support in the 
record. The mortgage was to have secured the remaining 1978 
payments of principal and interest and made no raference to 
the source of those payments. The record does not disclose 
whether or not Defendants were even aware of the Arizona farm 
ground at the time the contract was entered into. 
2 
It should be· noted that Plaintiff never. gave the promised 
- -- .:. i... • - I m ..... 1 Q A \ s 
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A (Bagley) He was to make that 
payment and also to give us a mortgage •••• He 
was to give the $60,000.00 and then secur~ the 
· other one with the mortgage. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) But itis true, is it 
not, that he was to make each one of. these-
payments as they become due; isn't that right? 
A (Bagley) That's right, yes. 
The real estate agent's commission was to be paid 
out of the 1978 payments which fell due after the closing. 
The propose~ closing documents (Exhibit ·16) provided that 
certain amounts were to go to the real estate agency from the 
payments as they were made on May 1, June l, and October 15, 
1978 respectively (Tr. 90 and 274). 
The Plaintiff, in cross-examination, acknowledged 
the necessity of his making the payment at the time of closing 
and the subsequent 1978 payments and of his failure to do so. 
Beginning with line 3 on page 168, the Plaintiff testified as 
follows: 
Q (Mr. Mciff) I'll rephrase it then: 
We had come to that meeting for the purpose of 
closing this transaction? That was the purpose 
of that session; was it not? 
A (Hutcheson) I believe that was our 
understanding. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Alright. 
A (Hutcheson} We had to go over the 
final papers. 
Q (Mr. Mclff) And we proceeded in· 
that vein until one point in the meeting when 
you and your counsel made a certain anno~ncement 
which cut short our closing efforts; is that 
right? 
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A (Hutcheson) That, I don't remember. 
Q (Mr •. Mciff) Isn't it a fact that 
you and your counsel announced during that 
session that you didn't have your money?. 
A (Hutcheson) I don't remember the 
announcement you're talking about. Now, John 
might have said something but I don't remember 
it. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Isn't it a fact that we 
discussed that at great length, the problem of 
money? 
A (Hutcheson) Of money, we d~d·~· 
Q (Mr. Mciff) And the problem with 
your getting your money? 
A (Hutcheson) Yes. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Isn't it true that you 
did not have it at that time? 
A (Hutcheson) We didn't have all of 
it. We did have part of it at that time. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Isn't it a fact that 
you expressed to us the hope that you'd be 
able to get your money in the not to·o distant 
future? 
A (Hutcheson) I did, yes. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) And, in fact, you 
estimated at that time that maybe by the end 
of next week, you'd be able to have your 
money? 
A (Hutcheson) That, I don't remember 
just what time. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) But you did make an 
estimate that you would be able to get your 
money? 
A 
Q 
future? 
A 
(Hutcheson) Yes. 
(Mr. Mciff) In the not too distant 
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Q (Mr. Mciff) And that· money you were 
talking about was the $60,000.00 that was 
needed to close it; is that correct? 
A (Hutcheson) Correct. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) So, you knew that money 
had to be paid at the time of closing and 
that, in addition to that, you had to pay this 
payment due on May 1st and the payment due on 
June 1st? 
A (Hutcheson) That was the schedule, 
yes. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) And you knew that; 
right? 
,, 
A (Hutcheson) Right. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) ~And that· was never 
modified; was it? 
A (Hutc~eson) After that, I don't 
believe it was. 
Subsequent to the failure to close on April 10, 
numerous contacts took place between the parties or their 
agents relating to whether or not the Plaintiff was going to 
be able to come up with his money. The· real estate agent, 
called by Plaintiff as a witness, testified as follows 
(Tr. 102 lines 9 through 16): 
Q (Mr. Mciff} Did you in the last two 
or three days check your telephone record and 
determine as a result thereof that during 
April and May you contacte~ Mr. Hutcheson on 
many occasions to try to bring.this thing 
tog~ther, if he could get his money? · 
A {Bagley} That's right. 
1 ' See, also, Plaintiff's testimony from Tr. 160, line 21 et. 
seq., set forth previously on page 12 in which he acknow-
ledged that he was to make a payment of $60,000 ·on the date 
of closing, April 10, 1978. 
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Q (Mr. Mciff) 
his money? 
But he could never get 
A (Bagley) Well, he never did. 
The Plaintiff acknowledged these contacts. Beginning on line 
17 page 177, the following testimony appears: 
Q (Mr~ Mciff) Mr. Hutcheson, isn't it 
a fact that during the latter part of April 
and all of May, we had numerous contacts with 
you for the purpose of determining whether or 
not you could come up with the money? 
A (Hutcheson) You had contact with 
me? 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Well 
A (Hutcheson) No. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Mr. Gleave, Mr. Shaw or 
Cathy Bagley? 
A (Hutcheson) I did talk to Cathy 
Bagley and also with Larry and Deloy possibly. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Right. 
A (Hutcheson) But not on numerous 
times but I would say two or three times, 
somewhere in there. 
Similar testimony from the Plaintiff appears beginning 
on line 17 page 171 of the transcript: 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Subsequent to the 
meeting of April 10th, isn't it true that 
Cathy Bagley contacted you on a number of 
occasions, like the 11th, 12th, 19th, 20th, 
25th of April, May 11th, 12th, 16th and the 
subject of all those· contacts from Cathy 
Bagley was whether or not you could come up 
with your money? 
A (Hutcheson) That is not true, , 
because we had other business with Cathy. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Well, let me.just 
rephrase it: Isn't it true that was discussed 
in many of those conversations. 
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A (Hutcheson) I don't know just how 
many but it was discussed a few times~ (Emphasis 
added) 
Plaintiff went on to testify that he would not ha~e closed if 
he would have had a million dollars, 1 but that he never 
conveyed that information to Mr. Gleave or Mr. Shaw, but that 
he did "mention" it to Cathy Bagley, the real estate agent· 
(Tr. 172). 
From the beginning of the negotiations between the 
parties, it was discussed that the reason for the sale and 
the payment schedules agreed upon were geared to meet Def en-
dants' obligations in favor of Zions Bank and secured by a 
trust deed against the ranch (Tr. 269). Defendants' had an 
obligation due Zions Bank of some $72,000.00 on April 1, 1978 
(Tr. 269). As o_riginally agreed, the transaction between the 
parties was to have closed on March 15, some fifteen days 
before the payment was due Zions.Bank (Exhibit 11). As 
previously noted, the agreement was modified to allow a 
closing date of April 10, but with farming operations to 
commence March l~. In re~erence·to the obligation at Zions, 
the real estate agent testified: 
Q (Mr. Mciff) You knew they had a 
payment due April 1st which was to be paid 
out of $60,000.00 on the closing payment~ 
A (Bagley) . That's right. 
~This self-serving declaration is of the kind one-c~n indulge 
in when he does not have the money and is therefore not 
obliged to deal responsibly with the factual reality of being 
able to perform. Plaintiff testified that he was in financial 
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Q (Mr. Mciff) That was discussed 
among all the parties? 
A (Bagley) Yes. 
Q 
10th? 
(Mr~ Mciff) Discussed on April 
A (Bagley) Yes. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Did you become aware 
that when Mr. Hutcheson didn't come un with 
. ~ 
his money did Mr. Gleave and Mr. Shaw see 
other buyers? · · 
A (Bagley) Yes. I don't know whether 
I was--I thought they probably would. . ~ 
(Tr. 103, lines 6 ~hrough 18) 
As above noted, there followed several contacts 
between the parties or their agents during the months of 
April and May for the purpose of ascertaining whether or not 
the.Plaintiff was going to be able to come up with his money. 
Finally, on June 5, 1980 Defendants, through their attorney 
Mr. Mciff, initiated .a contact with Plaintiff's attorney John 
Robinson in Arizona. The latter was Plaintiff's exclusive 
attorney in the instant matter (Tr. 178), and the Court 
specifically found that he was the agent of the Plaintiff and 
that the Plaintiff was bound by his representations (Tr. 
305). 
This contact resulted in a three-way telephone 
conversation between the Defendant Gleave, the Defendants' 
attorney Mr. Mciff, and the.Plaintiff's attorney Mr. Robinson. 
The conversation was taped, and the tape was admitted in 
evidence as Exhibit 26. A transcript of the said conversation 
appears as an addendum to this brief. 
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The conversation in gues~ion sets several things to 
rest. It successfully rebutted the theory of unperformed 
conditions precedent and the theory of fraud; which formed 
the basis of the two causes of action set forth in the Plain-
tiff's second amended complaint. After receiving assurance 
that the sprinklers were working, the following appears: 
MR. McIFF: Any other obstac1e, John, 
that you see that we need to resolve? 
MR. ROBINSON; On your end of it, 
I really don't. The only thing I was ?oq~ 
cerned about was making sure the sprinklers 
were taken care of. (Emphasis added}. (Tr. 
290, lines 22 through 26). 
The fact that everything hinged on Plaintiff .being able to 
come up with his money ap·pears clear throughout the conversa-
tion. The long delay was acknowledged and· Mr. Robinson 
thanked the Defendants for their patience (Tr. 292). The 
fact that the conversation was "amicable" as Plaintiff asserts 
in his brief, should be viewed as no more nor no less than a . 
tribute to reasonable men. 
Plaintiff's brief erroneously asserts that the 
parties agreed the "cut-off" date was not critical. To the 
contrary, Mr. Gleave stated, "I think we can live with the 
15th [the agreed upon date], but it couldn't be any later 
than that." (Emphasis added) (Tr. 290, lines 2 and 3). 
The "cut-off date" was fixed by the Plaintiff's 
attorney Mr. Robinson (Tr. 289). If the Plaintiff could not 
' 
perform by then, then it was the Defendant's itated intent to 
"do something. else" (Tr. 289, line 18), and further if the 
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deal could not be closed on or before that date, the Defendants 
were going to "go another route" to try to solve their problem 
(Tr. 291, line 17 and 18) i their specific problem-being that 
they were then in default some sixty-five days on the payment 
due Zions Bank. To Mr. Mciff's assertion that his client 
Gleave was "really concerned", the fol lowing appears.: 
MR. ROBINSON': Wel 1, I don It blame him. 
I would be too. 
MR. McIFF: The bank is really pressing 
us. We feel like we've really got to ,do ,, 
.something. 
MR. ROBINSON: I don't blame· you a bit. 
(Tr. 288, lines 1 through ~) 
The parties then proceeded to agree on the "cut-off" date of. 
June 15, 1980. 
Plaintiff has sought to rely on the Defendant 
Gleave's reference to the fact that the Defendants would have 
ninety days following the filing of a notice of default by 
Zions Bank (Tr. 292). The Defendants' comment does not 
fairly relate to an extension of the "cut-off date", but 
rather to the time frame in which the Defendants would have 
to solve their problem presumably by finding another buyer 
who could purchase a ranch valued at $962~500.00. It should 
be added parenthetically what appears to be obvious, and tl).at 
is that finding a buyer for this ~ize of transaction is not· 
an easy task, and that ninety days for that pur~ose would 
normally be woefully inadequate. ... 
Immediately following the telephone conversation, a 
letter was prepared and mailed to the Plaintiff's.. attorney 
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John Robinson by regi~tered mail (Tr~ 293)~ The letter was 
prepared in the presence of the Defendant Gleave and reviewed 
by him immediately prior to mailing (Tr. 293 and 294). The 
Plaintiff testified that his attorney at trial (Mr. Olsen) 
had secured a copy of the same from his attorney in Arizona, 
and the Plaintiff's copy was produced in open court at the_· 
·time of trial (Tr. 176 and 177). The letter was received in 
evidence as Exhibit 21, a photocopy of the same being attached 
as an addendum to the instant brief. 
The letter recites the agreement reached in the 
telephone conversation, and provides in part as fol lows,_ to-
wit: 
In any event, we have agreed on Thursday, 
June 15, 1978, as a cut-off date to complete 
the transaction_and tender the money. Failing 
your client's being able to perform on that 
date, Gleave and Shaw would be entitled to 
make whatever other arrari.gements they Q.eemed 
advantageous: to them. 
The letter further recites "if you wish to use this 
letter to illustrate the loss your client will suffer, feel 
free to do so". Plaintiff's awareness of the impending loss 
was discussed in the telephone conversation: 
MR. McIFF: Tell your people that Clyde's 
put some money in it that he runs the risk of 
losing, and that he'd better be aware of .that. 
MR. ROBINSON: I've made. them all totally 
aware of that. 
(Tr. 290, lines 11 through 15) 
No contact was received from the Plaint~f~ or his 
attorney between June 5 and the agreed upon cut-:-off date of 
June _15 (Tr. 294). On July 7, 1978, Zions Bank recorded a 
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notice of default against the Defendants premised on their 
failure to make the payment that had been due April 1 (Tr. 
272). Also in the forepart of July, the Defendants received 
the first contact they had had from either the Plaintiff or 
his attorney since the June 5 telephone conversation (Tr. 
294). Pursuant to agreement, .the parties met at the Big Rock 
Candy Mountain Cafe in southern Sevier County (Tr. ~95). 
Gleave's account of the conversation was as follows, to-wit: 
A (Gleave) Clyde told us that he had 
talked with John Robinson and he said,,. "What 
are you going to do with me now". 
Q {Mr. Mclff) What else was said? 
A (Gleave) I told him that as far as 
we were concerned the deal was off but if he 
would come up with his money, we would re-
negotiate a new deal. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Did you have any discus-
sion about other transactions you were then 
considering? 
A (Gleave) Yes. I told him at that 
time that we were considering selling the 
water to Virginia Jenkins or to Allen Nielson. 
Q (Mr. Mciff) Did he, at any time 
prior to your concluding the transaction with 
Virginia Jenkins contact you and advise you 
that he had his money? 
A (Gleave) No~ 
(Tr. 295, lines 10 through 25) 
·on August. 17, 1978, the Defendants enter~d into an 
agreement with Virginia Jenkins to-sell all of the water 
rights which had historically been used for the sprink~ing 
' irrigation system (Tr. 295 and 298). The Defendarits. received 
$50,000.00 down payment from Virginia Jenkins which was 
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above, at no time prior to concluding the transaction witti 
Virginia Jenkins did the Plaintiff advlse that he had his 
money and was prepared to go forward (Tr. 295). 
POINT II 
SUBSEQUENT TO TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT,· 
PLAINTIFF HAD NO INTEREST IN THE P ~:OPER'I'Y 
OR RIGHTS IN RESPECT TO RESALE BY DEFENDANTS 
Frorn·and after April 10, 1978, the date set for the 
closing, the Plaintiff was in default under the terms of the 
agreement and would have been constantly aware t~1ereof. · .To 
have sent him a notice that he was in default would have been 
a meaningless act. The only question was how long this 
default was going to be allowed to continue. As the evidence 
recited heretofore clearly establishes, Plaintiff initially 
estimated that he would be able to cure his default within 
some ten days. Almost two mon'f:hs elapsed before the Defendants 
brought the matter to a head, though there were several 
contacts during the interim relating to whether Plaintiff was 
going to be able to get the money. 
In lieu of unilaterally fixing a cut-off date for 
Plaintiff to cure his default, Defendants allowed the date to 
be fixed by Plaintiff's attorney and then concurred therein. 
It seems elementary that a cut-off date actually agreed to is 
preferable to one unilaterally imp~sed,. though Plaintiff's 
argument implies that such a· notice from the Defendants to 
the Plaintiff would have been adequate. ' 
The trial court found that the matter was finally 
terminated by mutual agreement in the June telephone conversa-
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tion. That was the clear intended result of the parties, as 
is evidenced by the registered letter sen.t to Plaintiff's 
attorney on the same day a~ the conversation. Wh~n no further 
response was received from Plaintiff until substantially 
after the "cut-off" date which had been agreed upon, it was 
reasonable and proper to conclude that the Plaintiff was not 
going to perform, ~ither because h~ could not, or had deter-
mined to abandon any effort theretoward, and it was further 
proper for Defendants to take "some other route" to solve 
,, 
their problem as they had advised of their express intent so 
to do. 
In the case Wiscombe vs. Lockhart Co., 608 P2d 236 
(1980), in_an opinion by Justice Wilkins, this court held 
that once a contract has been properly terminated, then the 
vendee in default has no further interest in the property. 
In that case, an assignee {Lockhart) of the vendee, sought to 
reinstate a contract which the latter had permitted to go 
into default only a brief three weeks earlier. The Court 
held that if the termination is proper then the property 
remains in the vendor, no longer subject to the contract. 1 
Plaintiff has sought to rely on a sale made by the 
Defendants subsequent to Plaintiff's breach and subsequent to 
------~-- -----~---------
1This does no~ leave the defaulting vendee without a remedy. 
He can stil 1 pursue an actic::m in unjust enrichment, pr.oviding 
the facts will suooort the same. Such an action is not 
premised on the c~~tract, but, to th~ contrary, r~cognizes 
that the same is over, and that the property has gone b~ck to 
the vendor. 
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the agreed on termination. The problem with that position 
can be readily·seen from this text: 
The general rule that a vendee in defau~t 
cannot recover back the money he has paid on 
the contract has been applied where the vendor, 
after a default of the vendee, has retaken 
possession of the property or has resold it. 
It has been said that it is immaterial that 
the vendor, after the purchaser has expressly 
refused to complete the purchase and has 
renounced the contract, resells the land, 
since to say·that the subsequent sale of the 
land gives a right to the purchaser to recover 
back the money paid on the contract would, in 
effect, be saying that the vendor could n~ver .. 
sell it without subjecting himself to A~ r 
action by the purchaser, and this has been 
held true although the vendor, immediately 
after the renunciation of the contract by the 
purchaser, resold the land at an advanced 
price. (77 Am Jur· 2d 628, Vendor and Purchaser, 
§503) 
Consistent with the foregoing language, the Utah 
court in the early case of Foxley vs. Rich, 35 U 162, 99 P 
·666 (1909), held that the fact that the vendor, under a 
contract to convey, breached and aba.ndoned the contract by 
conveying to another would not justify _the failure of the 
contract vendee to make payments due before that time, so as 
to entitle him to rescind and recover payments already made. 
POINT III 
PLAINTlFF 1 S COMPLAINT FAILS TO GIVE RISE 
TO A QUESTION ABOUT THE REASONABLENESS OF 
AGREED UPON DAMAGES RETAINED BY DEFENDANTS. 
The contractual proyision governing the retention 
of the monies advanced is as follows: 
' In the event the purchaser fails to pay -the 
balance of said pu~chase price or complete 
said purchase as herein proviqed, the :amounts 
paid hereon shall, at the option of the seller, 
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be retained as liquidated arid agreed damages 
(Exhibit 12, lines 37 and 38). 
Plaintiff's.complaint, as amended, contained two 
causes Of action. The first cause of action alleged unper-
formed conditions precedent, and the second cause alleged 
fraud. The remedy Plaintiff sought in both instances was · 
rescission and return of monies paid. 
The court found against Plaintiff on both of his 
causes, and further found that the transaction was~ter~inated 
because of the default of the Plaintiff, and because of his 
failure to cure the default within the specific time frame 
agreed upon. The Court's findings were supported by substan-
tial evidence as heretofore discussed. 
Plaintiff did not plead nor prove unjust enrichment, 
apparently electing to take an all or nothing approach with 
the two causes advanced. 
Notwithstanding Plaintiff's failure to plead or 
prove unjust enrichment, the court did proceed to co~sider 
the reasonableness of the damages agreed upon and retained by 
Defendants, to-wit $40,000.00. The unchallenged and uncontra-
dieted testimony before the court was that Defendants had 
sustained a loss of $56,100.00. This amount related to crop 
loss and did not attribute anything ·to other factors which 
have been considered in the long line of Utah cases dealing 
... 
with this subject, some of which are discussed in Plaintiff's 
brief. 
Defendants' ranch was tied up in the subject trans-
action for a period in excess of six months from December 6, 
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1977 through June 15, 1978. While Defendants were permitted 
to gra.ze their livestock, the several hundred irrigated acres 
were not planted and no harvest was reaped from the major· 
portions thereof. The trial court found that this loss was 
premised on the Plaintiff's failure to perform as agreed. 
The Plaintiff argues that any loss sustained by the 
DefendaJ?-tS during the 1978 far~ing season was overcome by a 
sale of the water which occurred in the fall. The answer to 
that is that if Defendants would have been able to farm·the 
property, or if Plaintiff would have paid a fair rental, one 
or the other being clearly proper, then Defendants would have 
had those sums in addition to any sums resulting from the 
subsequent sale. 
Plaintiff further asserts that the sale ultimately 
made by Defendants was sufficiently advantageous to overshadow 
any loss during the 1978 farming season. That argument fails 
for two reasons, the first of which was set forth in the 
preceeding section and is simply- that once the agreement was 
terminated the subsequent sale is irrelevant, unless perhaps 
it were to arise in an unjust enrichment action wherein the 
seller was seeking to assert a claim for "loss of an advan-
tageous bargain", that being an appropriate element of a 
seller's damage. Perkin.s vs. Soencer, ·121 U 468, 243 P2d 446 
(1952). Defendants have not registered such a claimo 
Plaintiff's argument fails for the furtl~~ reason 
that there was inadaquate evidence to determ~ne ·just how 
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Defendants sold all their major water rights at a price 
substantially less than the proposed sale to Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff has sought to fix values on rem~ining property 
by relying on a real estate listing agreement which predates 
the sale to Plaintiff, and which called for prices substan-
tially in excess of those actually negotiated with Plaintiff. 
The proof, therefore, is not competent even if it were relevant. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings and the judgment of the triaJ court 
are supported by substantial evidence, and are entitled to a 
presumption of validity. 
The court found that the parties reached an agree-· 
ment; that the transaction failed to close because Plaintiff 
failed to make his payments; that he was granted additional 
time and still failed; that the transaction was terminated by 
an agreement reached through counsel; that the monies retained 
by Defendants were commensurate with losses actually sustained 
.and were reasonable; and that Plaintiff had failed in his 
burden of proving the causes of action which he had advanced. 
Reviewing the record in a light most favorable to 
the Court's findings and judgment dictates that they are 
entitled to be affirmed. 
Respecti~ully submitted, 
K. L. Mc 
JACKSON, 
151 Nor n Main Street 
Richfield, Utah · 84701 
Telephone: 896-5441 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Served two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of 
Respondent upon Plaintiff's/Appellant's attorney, Tex R. 
. ~1 
Olsen, by delivery to his office this (J~y of November, 
1980. 
' 
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N. JACKSON & Mc.IFF 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
Rl'-1AN 1-L JACKSON 
.. Mdf°~-
15 I N 0 n TH MA I N 5 T Ft E ~ ; 
RICHFIELD, UTAH 84701 
TELf:.'f.'HONE {HOI) 89€- ~-::41 
'OF COUN'JC:L 
CARVEL Ml\TT5$0N 
Mr. John B. Robinson 
counselor at Law 
709 South Highway 89A 
P. O. Box 216 
Cottonwood, Arizona 86326 
June 5, ·1973 
~ Dear John: 
; 
' This ~ill confirm the understariding arrive4 at.in the 
telephone conve~sation of this date between_you, 'Larry Gleave, 
and me. 
You anticipate that you will be able to be in Richfield 
on Monday, June 12, to execute all the documents and close the 
transaction between your client, Clyde Hutcheson, and my clients, 
Gleave and Shaw. You anticipate that you may be able to make 
payment prior to that date. 
In any event, we have agreed on Thursday, June 15, 1978, 
as a cutoff date to complete the transaction and tender the 
money. Failing your client•s being able to perform on that date, 
Gleave and Sh~w would be entitled to make whatever other arrange-
ments they deemed advantageous to them. 
I have apprcci~tcd working with you and recognize that 
you and your client have been in somewhat of a dilemma in trying 
to solve~ the problems in Arizona. Perhaps by setting a deadline 
we will assist your efforts. If you wish to use this letter to 
illustrate the loss your client will suffer, feel free to do so. 
Sincerely yours, 
KLM/a 
' 
Page 39 
ADDENDUM NO. I TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
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:o 
11 
12 
13 
14 
{lfoereupon Def end ants' 
_ Exhibit No.. 26 was <luly_ 
received in evidence) .. 
•
11HR.. McIFF: Operator, I'm calling John Robin-
,, .·~ 
son, Area Code 602, Telephone 634-5551'.· .. "'rid like to 
charge that to 896-5441 and report the charge back 
to that number. 
J"'s~t 
(Fol~ OV\-f ) 
Your name? 
Kay L. Mc If f. 
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